Should Nato think about Finland, Sweden again?

One of the ironies of Russia’s war against Ukraine — ostensibly fought to prevent that nation from joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) — has been its impact on two of Europe’s traditionally neutral states, Finland and Sweden. On May 18, just 84 days after the invasion, Swedish and Finnish ambassadors handed over applications to join Nato in a public ceremony at the alliance’s headquarters in Brussels.
“This is a historic moment which we must seize,” said Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg. “You are our closest partners, and your membership in Nato will increase our shared security.” It seems likely that their applications will be swiftly approved, and Nato will soon grow to a 32 member states.
Yet in the rush to give Putin a black eye by embracing Finland and Sweden, US and Nato leaders may be failing to consider the potential costs of inducting two more countries into what, after all, is intended to be a collective defense organisation.
There are only two clear-cut benefits to bringing in the two Nordic nations. The first is symbolic: providing a clear demonstration of European and democratic solidarity against Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. The second is technical: Admitting Finland and Sweden would better align the membership of Nato with that of the EU, avoiding the unlikely but problematic scenario in which an EU member state is subject to aggression but is not covered by Nato’s Article 5 mutual-defense pact.
In every other respect, however, the question of Finnish and Swedish membership is more complicated and worrisome. Consider overall European defense capacity. Yes, Finland and Sweden have highly advanced economies. They could be net contributors to Nato’s technological capabilities through national champions like Ericsson AB and Nokia Oyj. They are also more capable militarily than some other European states — particularly Finland, which has maintained conscription into the post-Cold War period and has a relatively wide range of military competencies, including the continent’s largest artillery force.
Yet from the point of view of existing Nato members ­­­­­­­— and particularly the US — it’s still not necessarily a n­­­et win. Finland and Sweden have long focused their militaries on defending their own territories, raising doubts about their value in contributing to a common defense, which is at the heart of Nato’s charter.
And while both nations have pledged to increase their military spending and ability to bolster Europe’s broader defenses, it is also possible that they would not. Instead, they may free-ride on America’s military strength — and its nuclear umbrella — as so many European states have done for years. According to the International Monetary Fund, neither country comes close to meeting the Nato goal of spending 2% of GDP on defense.
History suggests the most likely outcome is two more states adding to America’s defense burden at a time when Washington should be pivoting to Asia. Consider also the question of the defensibility of new Nato territory. Admitting Sweden could be strategically beneficial, allowing Nato forces to better control the Baltic Sea and to use Gotland Island, at an important chokepoint off the Baltic States, as a staging ground for any future conflict.
Even in the face of Russia’s aggression, support for adding the two members isn’t unanimous.

—Bloomberg